“When I get to the bottom
I go back to the top of the slide
Where I stop and turn
and I go for a ride
Till I get to the bottom and I see you again”
Helter Skelter/The Beatles
Maybe The Beatles didn’t have an economic implication with these lyrics when they wrote “Helter Skelter”, but it nonetheless fits, especially when we consider the effects of TARP and QE2. These two government programs, designed to reinflate the economy by allowing the Federal Reserve to buy bad assets off the books of the banks and to become a customer of treasuries, has given life to equities and commodities all in the same breath. The purchasing of those two asset classes has pushed down the dollar, thereby making riskier assets more attractive. We call this the “risk trade” and it’s what can happen when Uncle Sam props up one sector of the economy at the expense of another. More on that later. But first, I hope you’ll indulge me in setting the stage for what has led to not one, but two asset bubbles over the past decade. I realize many of you have heard me speak about what got us here, but a refresher might be welcome. I’ll also be brief.
We have to go all the way back to 2001, when Alan Greenspan, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve, lowered interest rates all the down to 1% (from 5.5%) by 2003 to help pull the U.S. out of a prior recession. This was due to the aftereffects of bubble #1, the tech bubble, where companies’ stock prices traded at price earnings multiples significantly higher than what could have been justified at the time. In that bubble, primarily played out in the Nasdaq stock exchange (where most technology companies traded), the advance of internet companies attracted investors first by a trickle, where the Nasdaq traded at approximately 1,000. As investors realized the new industry that was being created was one of historic significance, more money flowed into these stocks, sending share prices higher. It wasn’t long before share prices reached irrational levels and, beginning in 1999, the frenzy started. With the Nasdaq at around 2,200, it took only one and a half years before it reached its zenith, topping out at approximately 5,000. Irrational exuberance, fueled by the sentiment that “this time it’s different”, meant that normally rational investors through caution in the wind, as no one wanted to be left of the ever faster bandwagon.
But it wasn’t long before exuberance was dealt a blow of reality, as the economy began to falter and with it, the selling of those same bulletproof stocks that seemed invincible. Enter Alan Greenspan, who, with the economy in free fall (and after 9-11), felt that interest rate cuts were the answer to stimulate the economy once again. These interest rate cuts (from 5.5% in January 2001 to 1% in June 2003) were the fuel that helped to ignite the housing bubble (the top of the slide), which served as the catalyst for the worst financial collapse since the Great Depression. From 2003 to 2007, extremely low interest rates incentivized at first individuals, then developers and investors and finally financial institutions to take risks which, up to that point, were considered off limits by ethical standards. We’ve all heard the stories of average Americans taking out multiple contracts on properties with the intent to “flip” them and make a profit. Developers were getting dizzy attempting to keep up with the demand, while Wall Street urged banks to make even more loans to satisfy the demand for yield generated by the packaging of mortgage loans into collateralized debt obligations (CDO’s). And while there were a few voices attempting to inject sanity into the madness, they were quickly silenced as profits reigned over concern.
Additionally, consumers joined in on the act, not by flipping properties, but rather by using their homes as ATM’s. By taking advantage of their rising equity, homeowners found that they could take large home equity loans and/or lines of credit to purchase everything from cars to vacations to new furniture.
It didn’t take long before the 2000-2001 recession was far behind in the rear view mirror and the economy was roaring along at 6% nominal GDP between the first quarter of 2005 and the second quarter of 2006 (gross domestic product, the sum of all goods and services; not adjusted for inflation. www.data360.org). Money was being made, jobs were in abundance and the national unemployment rate for 2007 was just 4.6% (www.infoplease.com). There was only one problem; it was all being done with debt, not true growth generated from production. While it’s true that debt is an essential part of our economy (as well as constructive, as long as it’s being used to create), as in all of life, too much of one thing can be intoxicating and eventually, destructive. While debt used for consumption will drive jobs growth in the near term, too much will enslave the consumer by making him believe the upside is never ending and he’ll always have enough income to pay for the excess. That’s the problem with bubbles; reality usually is hidden behind a curtain while ever more engage in the “too good to be true” feeling of the moment. Reality then comes crashing down hard as the excesses give way to a sobering revelation: there really is a price for everything.
By mid 2007, the upside came to a screeching halt, as subprime borrowers began to falter on their obligations. The rest, as they say, is history, as Lehman Bros and Bear Stearns led the way into the worst financial meltdown since the Great Depression. Bubble #2 had burst. And along with it, 8 million jobs had vanished; construction jobs, financial jobs, retail jobs, auto sales jobs, manufacturing jobs. No sector was spared. All at a time when many Americans had “levered up” (or borrowed) up to the maximum their credit rating would allow. It was no surprise then, that foreclosures and bankruptcies soared to historic levels, both on a personal and business level.
It was clear that Washington had to act. Unemployment had skyrocketed to officially over 10% (although those “underemployed” or who had simply given up were not counted. If they had, the rate would have climbed significantly higher). Credit had frozen, as banks refused to lend not only to individuals or businesses, but to other financial institutions, since they didn’t know how many toxic assets (CDO’s) were on the books of those other institutions. Therefore, there was no comfort level as to the ability to repay. This forced Washington to respond in the only way they truly could to keep the flow of credit (aka business) moving; they guaranteed deposits at banks, brokered deals between financial institutions to buy out those that were about to fail and passed legislation to purchase up to $750 billion of toxic assets from those financial institutions. Effectively, the government had given these institutions cash in return for their toxic assets and/or taken stakes in those companies, thereby wiping out their bad assets. The printing of dollars to pay for toxic assets while rewarding these companies for their irresponsible business practices was unprecedented.
But it didn’t end there; with unemployment in double digits and the economy in shambles, Ben Bernanke (Chairman of the Federal Reserve) lowered interest rates all the way down to .25% (that’s one-quarter of one percent). His rationale for doing so was to restart (known as reflating) the economy by making loans attractive. While only banks could actually get the 0-.25% rate the Fed was offering (known as the Federal Funds rate), all loan rates, from mortgages to car loans, were cut to entice consumers to borrow to get the economy rolling again.
The historic government sponsored bailout to financial institutions (and non-financial as well, aka GM and Chrysler), in conjunction with the lowering of interest rates to approx zero, had another impact as well. With fixed rate investments (bonds, especially treasuries) now offering historic low yields, two consequences from that action would occur, thereby creating another bubble; commodities would soar in value and the “risk trade” would increase.
The “risk trade” is basically defined as when investors, who would normally limit the amount of risk of their investment portfolio, decide to take on more, for one of two reasons. The first reason is that, historically, investment grade bonds (rated BBB or higher, as well as money market accounts) paid anywhere from 2-5.5% interest (known as “yield”), without much risk. When the Fed lowered interest rates to 0-.25%, fixed income investments correspondingly yielded much lower as well. In the real world, this may look as follows: a retiree, who is used to getting 5.5% on his treasury bond without risk, might now only get about half of that. If his budget is based on the higher yield, he needs to either make up for the lost income or decrease his spending. And with food, energy and medical expenses continually rising, limiting his spending might not be an option. So where does he get the extra yield/income? Either from lower rated fixed income (known as “junk bonds”, lower rated bonds that carry additional default risk) or by investing in the equity markets, where dividend paying stocks and funds may not only make up the difference, but also give him appreciation as well. The downside to him “reaching for yield” is that he’s increased his risk substantially, since stocks and funds can and do move up or down in price on a daily basis versus a bond, which pays a stated rate of interest until maturity. At maturity, our retiree gets his principal investment back without risk of loss of principal.
The second reason an investor would increase his risk is to maximize return. This investor, who typically would allocate a percentage of his portfolio to fixed income for income and stability (a part of ”asset allocation”), may find that since the income is so low, the price aspect of the investment may be compromised as well (the fixed income investment may fall in value, due to other investors looking for growth and/or yield; therefore, they sell their fixed income). He may feel that it makes more sense to sell his fixed income investments and buy dividend yielding stocks and/or funds. Further, since interest rates are at historic lows, he may “leverage” or borrow money at cheap rates and invest it in dividend paying stocks and/or funds that yield significantly more than the fixed income investments. Effectively, he would then accomplish his goal of more income, while simultaneously increasing the value of his portfolio, due to other investors adopting the same strategy, thereby raising share values of stocks. Since it fell to a low of 676 in March 2009, the S&P 500 has doubled to 1,355 (as of April 27, 2011), all while unemployment rates have continued to struggle near double digits, GDP is still anemic and no significant jobs have been created. This is in direct contrast to past recoveries where, as the stock markets recover, GDP averages approx 5% annually and jobs are created at a rapid pace, which lowers unemployment and stimulates consumer consumption.
The other consequence is what we’re all currently witnessing; that of a runup in commodities prices. To keep it simple, we’ll limit it to the two that are most in the news: gold and silver.
Simply put, precious metals rise in value due to one important reason; as a hedge (or “bet”) against world currencies. If investors worldwide believe that a currency or currencies may lose their value sometime in the near future, either due to a lack of confidence in currencies or because of inflation, they may start purchasing precious metals as a way to invest in something tangible that has actual value. The dollar is the world’s reserve currency at present and has been since President Nixon took the US off the gold standard in 1971. Since that time, the full faith and credit of the US government has replaced the gold standard and the dollar has been the currency that the the world recognizes as the standard of the world. Since 1971, countries the world over have had the same type of confidence in the dollar as they had in gold. And since that time, the US government has, by and large, managed its currency responsibly (if not selfishly at times), so that that confidence did not waiver.
What happens then, when the US lowers interest rates to practically zero and also enters the fixed income market as a customer of its own debt? We’ve seen from above that the equity markets react favorably, since the hunt for yield forces investors to take on more risk, more than they might want. It also brings about a greed mentality, as the attraction of leverage entices investors to take on more risk than they may otherwise usually take when interest rates are higher.
But what about the dollar and its status of reserve currency of the world? Will other countries continue to view it as the “safe haven” as the US continues to print more and buy more of its own debt? The precious metals markets (and other commodities markets) are telling us that the US may be embarking on a strategy that ultimately changes the way the rest of the world views us. Confidence and inflation could ultimately undermine the dollar and push metals higher.
Consider: the US prints billions of dollars to buy the bad assets off of the books of the banks. Two years later it announces QE2 (Quantitative easing #2), a $600 billion Federal Reserve program that buys debt from the US Treasury, much the same way as Japan, Europe or China does; basically, it’s another customer. The result of such an expansion of its “balance sheet” (or increase of its debt load), is that interest rates are held down, since price and yield of bonds move in opposite directions. So if the US is buying bonds, the price of the bonds is pushed up (or maintained), but the yield is held down. Additionally, because the yield is low, those other countries looking for yield will only look to US debt as a safe haven, but not as an investment that pays well. Consequently, the dollar’s value may begin to lose value. All of this is fine as long as the buyers of US debt believe that the interest payments on the debt they’ve bought can be paid on time. But what if they don’t? What if one day they take a look at all the debt the US has generated ($14 trillion worth) and begin to wonder if they’ll continue to make payments? What if they begin to believe that the “safe haven” is not so safe? What could they do now as an insurance policy to “back up” their investments in the event that the US cannot make good on its obligations? After all, if the debt they hold is only as good as the credit of the issuer, what else could they purchase that historically doesn’t have as much volatility? And what if the dollar loses value because of that lack of confidence, to what extent can they offset that decline?
Enter gold and silver, which is still accepted as the universal standard of payment when currencies of the world begin to falter. Countries the world over have begun to invest in the metals as a way to “hedge” against currencies (especially the dollar), should the US not find a way to manage its debt in a responsible manner. Individual investors as well, have started to look at precious metals as a way to hedge their portfolios in the event that the dollar begins to tumble due to a lack of confidence. The price of an ounce of gold has risen from approximately $870/ounce five years ago to over $1,500/ounce today. As the US continues to procrastinate in its efforts to lower its debt, confidence continues to waiver, meaning precious metals prices continue to flourish as a hedge.
Which begs the question what, if anything, would happen long term to the dollar in the event confidence begins to waiver? We’ve already talked about the purchasing of precious metals short term, but after that? Buyers of US debt would undoubtedly respond to a lack of progress on the management of the US debt (read lack of action by Congress) by demanding higher interest on that debt. Whereas currently, buyers are content to continue buying debt at or around prices that are still favorable to the US, if the time comes when they decide that no progress is being made or worse yet, refuses to be made due to the hardship it would entail, the bids they may offer could be lower than the US would like to accept. If that happens (remember that price and yield move in opposite directions), the US would have to offer higher yields just to sell that debt. The effects of that would be two fold.
First, interest rates in the US would rise, since the goverment would have to pay more interest on its debt to debt buyers. This would mean that interest rates in the private sector would also increase, since there would be competition between the public and private sectors. There would also undoubtedly be a downgrade in the debt rating of the US, currently AAA (by the way, over the past week the US debt rating has been put on “negative” watch by Standard and Poor’s, which ironically, fell asleep at the switch when it generously rated many CDOs as AAA during the runup in housing prices).
But the title of this post is “Bubbles” and that is where pain would be felt. Remember, equity prices have risen in no small part to the Fed keeping interest rates low (yes I know, corporate earnings have been positive; more on that on my next post). But in the event the US does not get its fiscal house in order (and that may require more pain than our campaigning elected officials may want to acknowledge), along with the combination of rising interest rates, plunging consumer confidence and rising commodity prices may very well send the US economy back toward recession and instigate another equity market selloff. In that scenario, more than just lower equity prices could be in store; a lack of confidence of that magnitude could mean that the dollar could begin to fall, starting a currency crisis.
How to deal with that though, is the subject for another post, as is the remedy for this problem that, so far, our elected officials are only at best, giving lip service to. Until then, enjoy the view from the top of the slide.
David Babecki